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Who counts in co-operatives, and how? In this paper empirical results are presented from recent 
quantitative and qualitative studies on Belgian co-operatives in which questions about who 
counts in co-operatives and how were treated (Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005; 
Durjardin, Mertens & Van Opstal, 2008; Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008; Van Opstal & 
Gijselinckx, 2008). The exploratory empirical evidence is presented after a brief overview of 
recent insights in stakeholder theory, inspiring the way co-operatives’ stakeholders can be 
conceived. Although in stakeholder theory multiple types of stakeholders are distinguished, the 
evidence presented leads us to the conclusion that a continuum between weak and strong 
models of multi-stakeholdership can be observed in Belgian co-operatives, with most of the co-
operatives studied situated in the classical single-member model and weaker models of multi-
stakeholdership. We look for explanations for the emerging pattern and try to formulate ways to 
overcome hindrances for the development of multi-stakeholder co-operative entrepreneurship, 
especially in the provision of quasi public goods and services, a gingerly growing field in the 
Belgian co-operative sector. 
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1 Introduction 
Stakeholder theory suggests that economic organizations are responsible to a variety of groups or 
‘stakeholders’ in society – other than just the organization’s owners (see a.o. Bryson, 2003; 
Clarke & Clegg, 1998; Cornforth, 2002; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jonker & 
Foster, 2002; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Rousseau & Shperling, 2003; Tirole, 2001). 
Stakeholders are often defined to be those individuals and groups who are influenced by or have 
an influence on the activities of an organization (Freeman, 1984). Apart from the owners of an 
organization, one generally refers to employees, clients, suppliers, the local community in which 
the organization is based. Some argue that NGO’s representing wider social or ecological 
interest, the ‘wider community’ and ‘future generations’ are stakeholders of an organization. It 
is a fair question to ask how far one needs to go in identifying stakeholders of an organization as 
well as to how and how far stakeholders should be allowed to have an influence on an 
organization (Leys, Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2009).  
Whereas for most enterprises, it is not an evident task to find out who their stakeholders are, 
what stakes should be taken into account and how they should be given voice, co-operatives by 
virtue of their essential properties have a more natural inclination towards stakeholder 
management – albeit not evidently multi-stakeholder management.  
In co-operatives, ownership rights and control power is usually assigned to one single category of 
stakeholders, this category however having a double economic function in the co-operative: they 
are both user and shareholder of the co-operative. This way, they are ‘stakeholder by design’, as 
well as ‘natural stakeholders’ (Tirole, 2001). Thomas (2004) states this participatory character to 
result in greater stakeholder involvement, next to other advantages such as enhanced efficiency 
and a large potential to attract volunteers. Levi (2001) and Pezzini (2006) stress the focus on co-
operative values and ‘concern for community’ which make co-operatives more likely to focus on 
goals beyond their members. The Green book of the European Commission (2007) refers to the 
reversed instrument-goal relationship to argue that co-operatives are in good books with respect 
to the integration of stakeholders.  
In recent years, forms of multi-stakeholder co-operatives emerge. In this type membership is 
broadened beyond the traditional one type of member category. This may broaden the scope of 
objectives of the co-operative, strengthening the public character of the services they deliver. 
Such a multi-stakeholder co-operative may also take a lead in innovation, as it may fall back on a 
large network of its constituent partners, while being able to confront and exchange different 
points of view within one and the same organization (Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2009). According 
to Pezzini (2006) the multi-stakeholder co-operative is the logical translation of the seventh co-
operative principle (concern for community) defined by the ICA. In more and more countries 
multi-stakeholdership is institutionalized in laws and regulations with respect to social 
enterprises, based on the co-operative model, i.c. Italy’s ‘social co-operative’, Portugal’s 
‘cooperativa solidariedade social’ and France’s ‘société co-operative d’intérêt collectif’ in which 
a co-operation between workers, users, public authorities and other stakeholders is expected. 
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In Belgium some leading co-operatives are established as economic vehicles of a social 
movement, or are supported by civil society actors. The institutional members of these co-
operatives represent the interests of societal groups (e.g. workers movements, agrarian 
movements,…) and even of those stakeholder categories that cannot speak for themselves 
(environmental movements, third world movements,…).   
In this paper empirical results are presented from recent studies on Belgian co-operatives in 
which questions about who counts in co-operatives and how were treated. Thus, paragraph 3 of 
this paper is based on studies by Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers (2005), Durjardin, Mertens 
& Van Opstal (2008), Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008) and Van Opstal & Gijselinckx (2008). 
The empirical evidence is presented after a brief overview of recent insights in stakeholder 
theory, inspiring the way co-operatives’ stakeholders can be conceived (paragraph 2). In the 
concluding section of this paper we look for explanations for the emerging pattern and try to 
formulate ways to overcome hindrances for the development of multi-stakeholder co-operative 
entrepreneurship, especially in the provision of quasi public goods and services, a gingerly 
growing field in the Belgian co-operative sector (paragraph 4). 
 
2 Stakeholder Theory 
The concept of ‘stakeholder’ makes allusion to the concept of ‘shareholder’, i.c. that unique 
category of individuals or institutions that owns an enterprise and shares the profits and the risks 
of it. For enterprises quoted on the stock exchange, one sometimes refers to ‘stockholder’ as the 
counterpart of stakeholder, pointing to the fact that the only stake that the former have is their 
‘stock’, which they can get rid of rather easily and quickly and in a potentially profitable way, 
which tends to make their relationship rather volatile and profit-driven, whereas the stake of the 
latter is broader and more lasting. ‘Stakeholder’, on the contrary, is a concept that refers to 
those categories of individuals or institutions that have a ‘stake’ in an enterprise or an 
organization. According to Bryson (2003), the contemporary use of the concept refers to a 
claimant toward whom an organization has fiduciary responsibility.1 A much cited definition of 
stakeholder has been formulated by Freeman (1984). According to Freeman, stakeholders can be 
defined as “those individuals and groups who are influenced by or have an influence on the 
activities of an organization”.  
Rousseau & Shperling (2003) make a distinction between internal and external stakeholders of an 
economic organization. Shareholders, managers and employees are internal stakeholders. 
External stakeholders are governments, consumers, suppliers, trade unions and pressure groups. 
Along with Freeman, Jonker & Foster (2002) claim it is the core idea of stakeholder theory not 
only to recognize internal stakeholders of an economic organization, with whom stakeholder 
communication has been implemented for a longer time and has become obligatory (e.g. 
employees councils in enterprises with a certain number of employees, general assemblies for 
                                                 
1 In contrast to the original meaning of the concept, which referred to the ‘person entrusted with the stakes of bettors’, 
who had to deliver the stakes to the winners of a contest and who, therefore was himself bearer of fiduciary 
responsibility (Bryson, 2003). 
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shareholders of enterprises quoted on the stock exchange,...), or external stakeholders with 
evident economic claims, but also to recognize external stakeholders whose claims are patently 
political or social in nature. According to Donaldson & Preston (1995), all stakeholder entities 
have legitimate and equal interests and a mutual dependency exists between them and the firm. 
 
Figure 1: Stakeholder model by Donaldson & Preston (1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tirole (2001) suggests to make a distinction between ‘natural stakeholders’ and ‘stakeholders by 
design’. ‘Natural stakeholders’, such as employees, customers, suppliers, but also communities 
where the firm’s plants are located and potential pollutees, have an ‘innate’ relationship with 
the organization. ‘Stakeholders by design’, such as investors or shareholders, are stakeholders by 
virtue of the structure of an organization. Tirole defines the ‘stakeholder society’ as a 
combination of a broad mission of management (maximizing the sum of the various stakeholders’ 
surpluses) and sharing of control by stakeholders. Tirole sees governments as the ultimate 
stakeholder-society organizations, “since they are instructed to balance the welfares of many 
different interest groups” (p.24).  
According to Clarke & Clegg (1998) stakeholder management often hardly scratches the surface 
of ongoing business practice. Most corporations quoted on the stock exchange only adopt a weak 
model of stakeholder management (Leys, Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2009). Not only because of 
the vast array of different stakeholder entities, but also because the stakes of these different 
stakeholders often prove to be contradictory, and because it is not always clear who is to be 
seen as the legitimate representative of a more universal or abstract stakeholder entity (such as 
the environment or future generations) that cannot act and speak for itself. It is a fair question 
Governments 
Suppliers 
Trade unions 
Investors Political 
groups 
Communities 
Customers FIRM 
Employees 
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how far one needs to go in identifying stakeholders of an organization as well as to how these 
different categories of stakeholders should be involved (Leys, Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2009). 
Who are an organization’s stakeholders and what stakes have to be taken into account by an 
organization?  
The answer to the question of who is a stakeholder and what are its stakes varies according to 
the organization and its context. However, according to proponents of stakeholder theory, 
identifying and typifying its stakeholders is a crucial and primary step for any organization 
adopting a stakeholder approach. Without it no efficient stakeholder communication can be set 
up. Many attempts to put stakeholder management into practice fail because of the lack of a 
proper identification of one’s stakeholders, of their properties and resulting claims, providing 
the basis for an adequate strategy towards them (Jonker & Foster, 2002). 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) tried to develop handles for the identification and typification of 
stakeholders. They suggest to identify and classify stakeholder entities according to the power 
they have on the one hand and the legitimacy and urgency of their claims on the other hand.  
 
Figure 2: Types of stakeholders by Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) 
 
 
 
- Dormant stakeholders do not exercise power because their claims are not or not sufficiently 
urgent and legitimate. However, they have potence to increase in urgence and legitimacy. 
- The claim of discretionary stakeholders is legitimate but not urgent, and discretionary 
stakeholders lack power to exercise an influence on the organization.  
- Demanding stakeholders do have urgent claims, however they lack legitimacy. They can be 
demanding towards the management of an organization, but they have no power. 
- Dominant stakeholders do have power and their claims are legitimate, albeit not urgent. 
They should be involved in the decision making process of an organization. 
4. dominant 
1. dormant  
2. discretionary  
6. dependent 
7. definitive 
5. dangerous 
3. demanding  
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- Dangerous stakeholders also have power and their claims are urgent. However, their claims 
are not legitimate. They might use illegal means to extort their claims from managers. An 
organization should keep a weather eye open for dangerous stakeholders. 
- Dependent stakeholders lack power, although their claims are legitimate and urgent. They 
depend on others, such as dominant stakeholders, to use power to force their will on 
managers. 
- Ultimate stakeholders are powerful and their claims are legitimate and urgent. Along with 
the dominant stakeholders they should be part of the decision making structure of an 
organization.  
However, deciding about the legitimacy, urgency and power of stakeholders is not as easy as it 
seems to be. The most easy to decide upon may be the attribute of power. Power is defined as 
the ability to exercise an influence on the organization, even against the will of the 
organization. It is a necessary property of the structural relation between the organization and 
the stakeholder category and powerful stakeholders can quite easily be defined. Resource 
dependency theory and institutional theory can be used to explain why organizations respond in 
certain ways to certain types of stakeholders bearing more or less power. However, according to 
Jonker & Foster resource dependency and institutional theory are only valuable explanations of 
reactions to economic and formal/legal pressures respectively, but they fail to account for 
political power. Moreover, whereas some authors suggest to limit stakeholders to entities that 
have sufficient power to influence the organization: shareholders, employees, suppliers, 
customers, it was precisely Freeman’s intention to broaden managements’ views beyond these 
obvious and (more or less) powerful categories of stakeholders (Jonker & Foster, 2002).  
Legitimacy and urgency are even more difficult attributes to decide upon. They are attributes of 
the claims of stakeholders. These attributes are social constructs. They cannot be found in the 
structural relationship between stakeholders and the organization, but are discursive in kind. 
Some claims are said to be legitimate or urgent whilst others are not. Whereas Freeman used the 
term legitimacy to refer to the rational appropriateness of spending time with stakeholders, 
measured in terms of the cost of allocating scarce resources, Mitchell, Agle & Wood propose a 
more normative evaluation. According to them, the basis for the evaluation of the legitimacy of 
stakeholder claims has to be more or less deduced from the existing values and norms in society. 
An organization will suppose that claims are desirable, right or in accordance to the norms, 
values and definitions of the stakeholder, the organization or society. According to Jonker & 
Foster however this makes legitimacy such a broad construct that it will be ultimately self-
defeating when used to exclude parties from a relationship and will not seriously affect 
outcomes of stakeholder relationships in the longer run (Jonker & Foster, 2002). 
What is meant by the urgency of a claim is not clearly indicated by Mitchell, Agle & Wood. Foster 
& Jonker propose to use the term ‘criticality’ instead. ‘Critical’ refers to a significant, serious 
issue or a ‘defining moment’. This obviously is extremely time- and context dependent. A 
pressure group that did not exist before but, thanks to lobbying and presence in the press gains 
support by governments and the public in general, can all of a sudden raise an important and 
defining issue for an organization and claim to be involved in an organization (Jonker & Foster, 
2002). 
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Inspired by Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (1984), Jonker & Foster suggest to 
analyze the expression of the claims made by various parties (if expressed at all, C.G.) in terms 
of truth (referring to the objective world), in terms of rightness (referring to the social world) 
and in terms of authenticity and sincerity (referring to the personal world of inner states and 
feelings of the individuals involved) and to centre stakeholder dialogue around these issues 
(Jonker & Foster, 2002).  
Based on the attributes of power, criticality and rationality of stakes and parties, Jonker & 
Foster developed a grid that allows enterprises to decide about who is at stake and what their 
stakes look like. Moreover, if an enterprise manages to identify and typify its shareholders and 
their stakes, the next question is how they should be involved. This means that an enterprise 
should develop processes to manage the relationship as well as a form for the connections 
between the organization and the stakeholders. This results in the following model for analyzing 
stakeholder engagements: 
 
 
Table 1 The basic structure of the stakeholder model according to Jonker & Foster (2002) 
 
COMPONENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
  
STAKE 
(What are the key 
issues in the 
relationship?) 
 
PARTIES 
(Who or what are 
involved?) 
 
PROCESS 
(What processes are 
involved in managing 
the relationship?) 
 
CONNECTIONS 
(What form do the 
connections between 
the organization and the 
stakeholders take?) 
 
 
POWER 
 
Does the nature of 
the claim or stake 
have implications 
for the type of 
power involved? 
 
What type of power do 
the parties involved 
use (if required to 
obtain a result)? 
 
Do some processes 
result in the exercise 
of different types of 
power? 
 
What effects does the 
form of connections have 
on the form of power 
used? 
OR 
Is power exercised 
directly or indirectly? 
 
 
CRITICALITY 
 
Why is the interest 
or stake worth 
investing time and 
effort on? 
 
What is it about the 
attributes, behavior, 
attitudes or beliefs of 
the parties that makes 
the issue critical (i.c. 
important enough to 
engage)? 
 
 
Are the processes 
important to the 
ongoing life 
(operations) of the 
parties? Is it central 
to the decision-
making process? 
 
How critical or important 
does each party regard 
the connections? 
 
E 
L 
E 
M 
E 
N 
T 
S 
 
I 
N 
F 
L 
U 
E 
N 
C 
I 
N 
G 
 
O 
U 
T 
C 
O 
M 
E 
S 
 
RATIONALITY 
 
How is the interest 
or stake expressed 
(cognitive, social, 
 Personal?) 
 
What are the 
epistemological and 
ontological 
perspectives of the 
parties and how do 
they influence their 
view of the issue or 
interest? 
 
Do the processes 
affect the opportunity 
for the understanding 
based on a broad or 
narrow 
conceptualization of 
rationality? 
 
Does the form of the 
connection encourage or 
discourage dialogue 
rather than egocentric 
claims? 
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3 Whose Stakes are Taken into Account and How in Co-
operatives? 
3.1 Empirical Evidence and Methodology 
 
In what follows we explore who is at stake in co-operatives2 and how their stakes are taken into 
account, how stakeholders are managed in Belgian co-operatives. The exploration is based on 
several recent studies on Belgian co-operatives (Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005; 
Dujardin, Mertens & Van Opstal, 2008; Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008; Van Opstal & 
Gijselinckx, 2008). Within the framework of these studies, data have been collected and 
analysed through quantitative as well as qualitative research methods. A survey among 
accredited co-operatives3 in Belgium (N=175) conducted by the Higher Institute of Labour 
Studies, supported by the Centre d’Economié Sociale at the University of Liège (Autumn 2006), 
fully described by Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008). Some general information on these co-
operatives, taken from the same publication, can be found in annex 1. Interviews with either 
presidents or directors of 15 co-operatives have been conducted (Springtime 2005) and were first 
presented by Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers (2005). The authors selected the cases in such 
a way as to gather information from entities with different characteristics in terms of age, scope 
as well as economic activity. More information about these co-operatives can be found in annex 
2. Likewise, focus groups with non-accredited co-operatives, enterprises who act like co-
operatives but who do not have the legal personality of a co-operative society (with limited or 
unlimited liability) and social purpose enterprises have been held in June 2008. The results were 
first presented by Van Opstal & Gijselinckx (2008) by Dujardin, Mertens & Van Opstal (2008) 
respectively. The respondents were selected in such a way as to gather information from co-
operatives with different characteristics in terms of scope and economic activity. Because the 
focus groups were only held in Dutch, no co-operatives from the French and German speaking 
parts of Belgium have been included. Although the respondents were carefully selected, the 
                                                 
2 Although not all co-operatives may be regarded as social enterprises, the co-operative principles have been 
fundamental to the development of the contemporary definitions of the social economy. Especially the principles of 
democratic participation and restricted profit distribution are core to both co-operative and social entrepreneurship. The 
relationship between the principles of the co-operative and social economy has been explored by Marée & Saive (1983). 
3 Data of the Crossroads Bank of Enterprises of April 2008 show that in Belgium nearly 40,000 enterprises with one or 
another form of co-operative legal personality are active. Not all of these co-operatives can be said to be co-operatives 
according to the definition of a co-operative formulated by the ICA (1995). The Belgian law on co-operatives is very 
liberal in that it does not mention any of the principles of co-operative entrepreneurship. In order to find out and 
support those co-operatives who operate according to these principles, a National Council of Co-operation has been 
established (Law of 10 July 1955). This council accredits co-operatives who request for an accreditation and who satisfy 
the following criteria (Royal Decree of 8 January 1962), largely inspired by the co-operative principles recognized by the 
international movement of co-operatives: 
- voluntary membership 
- equal voting rights for all members or restriction of voting rights in the general assembly 
- assignment of the board of directors by the general assembly 
- restricted dividend (maximum 6%) 
- patronage dividend for members pro rata transactions 
Of the 40,000 enterprises with the legal form of a co-operative, 472 were accredited by the National Council of Co-
operation (August, 2008).   
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information gathered from these focus groups and in-depth interviews is purely explorative and 
does not pretend to give any representative image of the sector. 
3.2 Members as Co-operatives Primary Stakeholders 
 
Theoretically it can be argued that out of the specific constitution of co-operatives a specific 
type of stakeholder management emerges, albeit not necessarily multi-stakeholdership.  
 
Co-operatives are member organizations, voluntarily set up (or joined) by their members, aiming 
to satisfy their members’ need(s). Their members have a double relationship with the co-
operative. They are both owners and users, whether consumers, producers, employees. By virtue 
of their ownership relation to the co-operative they are investor-driven and ‘stakeholder by 
design’ (Tirole, 2001). At the same time however, by virtue of their user-relationship to the co-
operative, they are user-driven and ‘natural stakeholders’ (Tirole, 2001). They are ‘ultimate and 
dominant stakeholders’ (Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), having the power to make their claims 
heard and to influence the way in which they will be taken care of. Their claims are critical 
(Jonker & Foster, 2002), being the very reason for the co-operative’s existence.  
 
All this means that ‘stakeholder dialogue’, in the sense of member-dialogue and member 
participation, at least theoretically, is institutionalized in co-operatives. It emerges necessarily 
from the properties of the co-operative. However, this does not naturally imply multi-
stakeholdership as the evidence will show.  
 
a) Member involvement 
 
From the in-depth interviews with representatives of co-operatives, we learn that respondents 
think member involvement to be important for a co-operative. Some indeed mention it to be the 
core characteristic of a co-operative. The only one who did not think members to be important is 
a representative of a co-operative that sees its members as plain investors. They finance the co-
operative because of their personal relationship with the founders, not because of a commonly 
defined need or idea. When asked to take decisions in the general assembly, these members 
intend to say they do not know anything about the co-operative and they can’t take any decision 
(Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005).  
 
Birchall & Simmons (2001) distinguish the following ways of member involvement in co-
operatives: 
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- participation in co-operative decision making; 
- delivering services to the co-operative on a voluntary and non-refunded basis; 
- taking part in the social life of the co-operative. 
 
Respondents of the in-depth interviews (Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005) defined 
member involvement as: 
 
- being regularly in touch with the co-operative 
- spreading the ideas of the co-operative 
- increasing shares. 
 
All of the respondents of the in-depth interviews stated that giving sufficient, clear and 
transparent information is a crucial factor for member involvement. Member advantages are 
equally important to create member involvement. Basically this means that the co-operative 
should deliver goods and services that satisfy the needs of its members (Develtere, Meireman & 
Raymaekers, 2005).  
 
b) Member advantages 
 
Not surprisingly top-three advantages in the survey conducted among accredited co-operatives in 
Belgium were fair price/quality relation (least indicated by the financial co-operatives), 
realization of economies of scale (mostly indicated by co-operatives in the primary sector), co-
operative dividend (mostly indicated by the financial co-operatives). The patronage dividend was 
mentioned by 25% of the co-operatives in the survey (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
Focus groups with non-accredited co-operatives, showed that most of the enterprises give 
patronage dividends to their members, though it seems not to be evident in workers co-
operatives in which more equal payment is considered to be a ruling principle, as well as in 
multi-stakeholder co-operatives in which multiple types of members have a different relationship 
with the co-operative (Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2008). Besides the categories given in the 
questionnaire, 25% of the co-operatives surveyed mentioned other types of member advantages, 
such as information sharing, sharing logistics, democratic participation, societal profit, price 
reductions, risk spreading, and legal help (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008).  
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Table 2 Members advantages indicated by co-operatives (Survey of accredited co-
operatives, 2006) 
Primary sector Tertiary sector  
Total Machinery 
rings Other 
Secondary 
sector Pharmacies Financial  co-operatives Other 
Dividend 28% 5% 5% 40% 23% 75% 33% 
Employment 7% 3% 0% 20% 0% 0% 13% 
Education  3% 0% 11% 10% 0% 0% 3% 
Fair price/quality 50% 55% 63% 60% 62% 15% 50% 
Economies of scale 44% 65% 63% 20% 15% 20% 42% 
Patronage dividend 25% 15% 16% 20% 92% 15% 25% 
Other  25% 10% 11% 30% 54% 35% 30% 
N: 166 (item non-response: 9) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008 
 
c) Democratic participation by members 
 
Democratic participation by members was mentioned as a non-material advantage for members. 
Indeed, according to the international co-operative movement it is a key principle of co-
operative entrepreneurship (ICA, 1995). Birchall & Simmons (2001) hierarchically distinguish the 
following forms of participation in decision making: 
 
- giving information 
- getting information 
- consultation 
- taking part in actual decision making 
- exercising control 
 
As required by the criteria for accredition set forward by the National Council for Co-operation 
(cf. supra), members of accredited co-operatives usually participate in co-operatives’ decision 
making via participation in the general assembly and the board of directors. 90% of the co-
operatives in the survey on accredited co-operatives in Belgium invites its members for meetings 
of the general assembly, 62% for the board of directors. The great majority of those who do not 
invite them for participation at the general assembly are very small co-operatives with few 
members, leading their co-operative on a day-to-day basis (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 
2008). In the focus group with non-accredited co-operatives the voice given to members was 
mentioned as a crucial point of difference. Although not consciously arranged for, some co-
operatives with a lot of shareholders de facto had none of their members having more than 10% 
of the votes in the general assembly. To other co-operatives investigated, the principle of one 
man-one vote, even if relaxed to a ‘not more than 10% per shareholder’, was difficult to uphold. 
Some of the respondents did opt for voting rights pro rata capital investment, another one 
created a correction to this pro rata capital investment voting rights in the general assembly by 
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giving more seats (thus voice) to the minority shareholders within the board of directors (Van 
Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2008).  
 
In the survey on accredited co-operatives, participation in the board of directors is less indicated 
by machinery rings, i.c. small co-operatives in the agricultural sector whose main purpose it is to 
by jointly and share the use of costly machines (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). Focus 
group information learnt that in small co-operatives there is simply no distinction between the 
general assembly and a board of directors. In co-operatives whose members are independent 
enterprises, the composition of the board of directors is crucial. Members are member for 
economic reasons in the first place. The problem of the different horizon (short term vision of 
members versus long term vision of the co-operative) is a crucial factor. It is a real challenge to 
compose a board out of members who share the long term perspective of the co-operative. 
Besides this, participants of the focus group with non-accredited co-operatives also explicitly 
mentioned personal problems related to the election of the board. Most of them also state that 
their board is populated by (a mixture of internal and) external members (Van Opstal & 
Gijselinckx, 2008). Some of the respondents of the in-depth interviews confirm that their boards 
of directors are only populated by external, non-member directors. However, within these co-
operatives voices rise to change this situation (Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005). 
Commonly, respondents of the in-depth interviews mention one meeting of the general assembly 
a year as well as the possibility to hold a special general assembly when required.  
 
Besides the general assembly and board of directors, 10% of the co-operatives in the survey 
additionally mention member participation in an internal controlling body (Van Opstal, 
Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). However, this figure as well as information from the in-depth 
interviews and the focus groups suggests that most of the co-operatives engage external 
controllers.   
 
14% of the co-operatives surveyed indicate that they have developed additional channels of 
participation for members, such as customer circles, advisory committees, informal meetings 
and other communication channels (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008).  
 
From the in-depth interviews we know that some bigger co-operatives have set up systems of 
decentralized member participation. Milcobel for instance established 12 member circles which 
organize a member meeting at least once a year. They elect their own regional council and 
assign representatives for the general assembly as well as one representative for the board of 
directors. Cera established 45 regional advisory councils each electing four members for a 
national advisory council. Also Mechelse Veilingen and Laiterie Coopérative de Chéoux have set 
up a decentralized system of member involvement. All find it very useful to enhance members’ 
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involvement. However, not all representatives of big co-operatives share this opinion. Two of 
them do not think physical distance to be an obstacle for member involvement in a small country 
such as Belgium. One respondent thinks it does, but only in the short term. The effect would 
fade away in the long run (Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005).   
 
Figure 3 Possibility of participation by members in governance structures of co-
operatives, Belgium (Survey on accredited co-operatives, 2006) 
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N: 166 (item non-response: 9) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008) 
 
When members are allowed to participate, most of them seem to do so actively. A loglinear 
regression analysis shows that a 1% increase in the number of members leads to a 0.23%4 
decrease on average in participation in governance structures. This decrease is the biggest in the 
primary sector:  0.45% on average5. With respect to the actual participation in the board of 
directors, we see the same albeit slightly smaller tendency: a 1% increase in the number of 
members leads to a 0.1% decrease in participation on average6 (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 
2008).  
 
At least, this is what comes out of the quantitative analysis. The respondents of the in-depth 
interviews mentioned a lack of interest among members to participate. Moreover, participation 
seems to be predominantly white, male and 50+. Women, people from ethnic minorities and 
young people are under represented. Only four out of 15 respondents report the establishment of 
specific programmes to attract young members (Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005). 
                                                 
4 95% reliability: 0.18% - 0.28%, R² = 0.4021 and p < 0.001 
5 95% reliability: 0.36% - 0.53%, R² = 0.7114 and p < 0.001 
6 95% reliability: 0.01% - 0.19%, R² = 0.1158 and p < 0.05 
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Figure 4 Participation of members in governance structures of co-operatives, Belgium 
(Survey on accredited co-operatives, 2006)  
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Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008) 
 
Interesting to know is what the fields are that members have a say in. Table 3 shows that the 
financial-economic policy of the co-operative is the first topic (77%). In co-operative pharmacies 
the focus is on member advantages. 17% of the co-operatives report that members decide about 
external projects of the co-operative, such as support for social initiatives by non-profit 
organizations. This is mostly the case in financial co-operatives and co-operative pharmacies, as 
well as in non-machinery rings in the primary sector. In 10% of the co-operatives with paid 
employment, mostly situated in the pharmaceutical sector, members have a say in questions 
related to personnel (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
Table 3 Which domains of decision making are members of Belgian co-operatives allowed 
to have a say in? (Survey on accredited co-operatives, 2006) 
Primary sector Tertiary sector  
Total Machinery 
rings Other 
Secondary 
sector Pharmacies Financial co-ops Other 
Mission statement 53% 23% 61% 70% 36% 44% 71% 
Member advantages 37% 23% 39% 20% 91% 31% 41% 
HRM 10% 3% 0% 10% 27% 6% 15% 
Financial-economic 
policy 77% 88% 72% 80% 45% 63% 80% 
Support of external 
projects 17% 5% 22% 0% 27% 38% 20% 
Other 8% 10% 17% 0% 0% 31% 2% 
N: 161 (item nonrespons: 14) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008) 
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d) Categorization of members 
59% of the co-operatives analyzed grant certain categories of members a key position in the 
decision making process. 53% gives a stronger voice to founding members. In machinery rings this 
is the case for 76% (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). In the focus group the mechanism of 
distinguishing between categories of shares and granting voting rights to different categories is 
mentioned to be common practice. The idea is to preserve the ideology and interests of founding 
members, working members, social organizations or other types of members considered to have 
a crucial stake in the co-operative (Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2008).  
22% of the co-operatives surveyed mention social organizations as key-members (Van Opstal, 
Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). This institutional relationship between co-operatives and social 
organizations has to be related to the specific context of Belgium. In Belgium some major co-
operatives are historically linked to social movements. At first these were movements of 
workers, farmers and retailers. Their aim was to increase their members’ welfare and wellbeing 
through the opening up of credit and saving markets, the creation of economies of scale for 
distribution and treatment of primary goods and joint purchase for retailers, or the sale of good 
products, including pharmaceutical products at fair prices and accompanied by good advice 
about the use of them to consumers. Recently third world movements and environmental 
movements also established or warmly welcomed co-operatives who promote fair trade, ethical 
producing and financing. Co-operatives who were established in the wake of these social 
movements often are institutionally linked with ‘their’ primary stakeholders, the latter having an 
influence on the setting of the course the co-operative takes. In some of these co-operatives 
social organizations (mainly situated in the financial and pharmaceutical sector) are institutional 
members, whether or not alongside private persons. This means that civil society organizations, 
by being owner-user of the co-operatives, have a direct impact on the governance of these co-
operatives (Develtere & Raymaekers, 2005; Gijselinckx, Develtere & Raymaekers, 2007).  
Develtere (2006) puts forward the hypothesis that each co-operative is in need of ‘moral 
reference shareholders’, i.c. certain members (whether natural or institutional persons) who, 
more strongly than the other ones, identify themselves with the mission and vision of the co-
operative and hence might invest more time and money in the co-operative, thus trying to have 
a major influence on the course the co-operative takes. From the studies of co-operatives in 
Belgium, we know that often different types of shares and related positions in governance 
structures are created for different types of members, granting a bigger or smaller voice to 
certain types of members.  
3.3 Co-operatives and Stakeholder Participation in General 
Members are clearly seen as co-operatives primary stakeholders. Members’ involvement and 
participation is organized and recognized to be the core of the co-operative as a member based 
organization. But what about stakeholders in general? When asked how stakeholders, defined 
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generically as ‘those parties who are influenced by, or have an influence on the co-operative’7 
were allowed to participate in their governance structures, the following picture emerged from 
the survey:  
 
Table  4 Participation of stakeholders in governance structures of co-operatives in 
Belgium (Survey of accredited co-operatives, 2006) 
General Assembly Board of Directors Other channels of 
participation 
  
 Stakeholders 
invited voice invited voice invited voice 
Employees* 57% 24% 19% 9% 37% 18% 
Customers 15% 11% 4% 4% 9% 3% 
Suppliers 6% 6% 5% 5% 6% 2% 
Competitors 3% 2% 0% 0% 4% 1% 
Financiers 26% 21% 17% 14% 15% 7% 
Other 35% 31% 14% 14% 12% 5% 
(*): Figures on employees relate only to those co-operatives who are employers. 
N: 98 (item non-response: 77) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008) 
More than half of the co-operative employers invite employees to the general assembly and a 
quarter of them lend them voice in this governance structure. Almost a fifth gives them a seat in 
the Board of Directors. Other forms of participation (mainly the Employee Council – obligatory 
for enterprises of more than 50 employees and the Committee for Safety and Health at work) 
and internal information meetings) are also used to inform employees about the policy of the co-
operative and to give them the opportunity to influence decision making (18%). 24% of the co-
operative employers in the survey, however, does not invite employees to any of its participation 
structures. 
As mentioned earlier, social purpose companies (70% of whom are co-operatives), in case they 
have paid labour force, are obliged to organize workers’ participation, thus institutionally 
organizing economic participation of at least more than one type of members. The procedures by 
which workers can become members and loose their qualification of membership in case they 
leave the company have to be described in the articles of association of the company. In case a 
social purpose company has employees, each member of the general assembly should not have 
more than 5% of the votes. Most of the respondents of the focus group with social purpose 
companies (it is interesting to note that 9 out of 10 participants where representatives of co-
operatives who obtained the social purpose label) mention difficulties related to democratic 
participation of working members. A crucial factor for members participation is transparency. 
Especially with respect to financial information, most respondents find it a difficult task to 
provide financial information to workers, many of whom are low educated or at least have a 
limited back ground with respect to finances. One respondent said: “when you are situated in a 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between members and non-members stakeholders. Since the questions about 
‘stakeholders’ follow after these about members and collaborators, we cautiously assume that the respondents think 
about stakeholders other than members. 
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context of production with some playing the role of employer and others the role of employees 
participation is a completely different reality than when you are in a situation in which people 
with the same background co-operate to realize a common goal”. Some respondents mention 
they make a distinction between A- and B-types of members, in order to protect employers from 
situations in which they are refrained from fulfilling their role of employer. As Coates (2008) 
states, this might cup the principle of democratic workers’ participation. Other members 
essentially play the role of investor. As members, they have a say in the governance of the 
company and receive a limited dividend (Dujardin, Mertens, Van Opstal, 2008). 
Besides employees, financiers are indicated as another important category of stakeholders 
invited to participate in the governance structures of co-operatives. 26% of the co-operatives in 
the survey on accredited co-operatives invites them for the general assembly, 21% even gives 
them voice in this meeting. 17% invites them for meetings of the board of directors, 14% gives 
them voice in this meeting. Customers are less invited to participate in the governance 
structures of the co-operatives surveyed (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
Still other important categories of stakeholders mentioned as such by the co-operatives in the 
survey are other co-operative enterprises (defined as stakeholder by 30% of the co-operatives 
surveyed), social organizations (recognized by 29%, mainly those operating in the pharmaceutical 
and financial sectors), other non-co-operative enterprises (24%), trade unions (16%), 
governments (14%) and local governments (14%). Neighbors, environment associations and NGO’s 
are least mentioned as stakeholders (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
Participatory structures mentioned are team meetings and employee meetings, Employee 
Council, Council for Prevention and Health at Work (the latter two councils are required by law 
for enterprises with more than 50 employees) for co-operative employers, meetings with 
volunteers (for those co-operatives who work with volunteers), and meetings with buyers. Few 
mention meetings with neighbors of the co-operative (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
3.4 Indications of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Belgian Co-operatives 
‘Corporate social responsibility’ has been coined as a fashionable concept to indicate that 
organizations, corporations in particular, take into account other objectives than mere economic 
ones, notably ethical, social and environmental objectives (for an overview of the development 
of the CSR-concept, see Carroll, 1999). In an indirect way, the question about what CSR-
measures are taken can give a hint at what stakeholder claims are actually taken into account. 
The survey on accredited co-operatives questioned this. To this aim, we made use of the item 
list that was developed with respect to measuring corporate social responsibility by the Panel 
Survey of Organizations in Flanders (PASO) (De Vos, Buyens & De Stobbeleir, 2004). A distinction 
was made between the internal (7 items) and external responsibility of co-operatives, the 
external responsibility divided into social (7 items) and ecological questions (4 items) (Van 
Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
 17 
 
 
Table 5 Corporate social responsibility of accredited co-operatives (Survey on accredited 
co-operatives, 2006) 
 Measures taken Communication 
 None Occasionally General 
Policy 
Internal External No Formal 
Communication 
Internal social responsibility (*)  
N: 77 (item nonrespons: 2)  
Health and safety of employees 25% 21% 55% 81% 5% 19% 
Prevention of collective 
dismissal 
84% 1% 14% 67% 0% 33% 
Coaching of dismissed 
employees  
74% 15% 11% 74% 11% 26% 
Employment of target group 
employees 
63% 24% 13% 68% 14% 32% 
Coaching of target group 
employees 
76% 16% 8% 83% 22% 17% 
Work-family balance 39% 29% 32% 77% 2% 23% 
Participation of employees in 
decision making 
34% 22% 44% 85% 8% 17% 
External social responsibility (**) 
N: 148 (item nonrespons: 27) 
Transparancy about policy and 
impact 
49% 15% 36% 55% 40% 34% 
Support of social projects 62% 21% 17% 49% 44% 31% 
Support of cultural projects 68% 18% 13% 37% 46% 39% 
respect for the local community 
and culture 
71% 17% 12% 50% 40% 31% 
Public health and safety 68% 10% 22% 55% 21% 38% 
North-South relationships 80% 11% 9% 59% 24% 38% 
External responsibility: environment (***) 
N: 150 (item nonrespons: 25) 
Monitoring of effects on 
environment 
59% 15% 25% 54% 18% 39% 
Prevention of environmental 
damage 
62% 14% 24% 52% 13% 46% 
Recycling of waste 44% 19% 37% 60% 7% 37% 
Reparation of environmental 
damage 
82% 11% 7% 38% 8% 62% 
(*) Percentages about internal responsibility only with respect to those co-operatives who are employers. Percentages 
with respect to communication about internal responsibility only refer to those co-operatives who mention to have taken 
measures with respect to these items.  
(**) Percentages with respect to communication about external social responsibility only refer to those co-operatives who 
mention to have taken measures with respect to these items.  
(***) Percentages with respect to communication about external responsibility - environment only refer to those co-
operatives who mention to have taken measures with respect to these items. 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008) 
Items with respect to internal social responsibility basically refer to employees. Therefore 
figures with respect to these items only relate to employers. The figures show that co-operative 
employers mostly take measures with respect to the health and safety of employees at work, the 
participation of employees in decision making and the work-family balance. More than 70% of the 
employers indicated at least one of these items. 21% said not to take any measures in the field 
of internal social responsibility. Communication about these measures is mostly internal. 
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External communication is mostly related the employment of target groups (Van Opstal, 
Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
A little less than half of the respondents (47%) indicates to take measures within the framework 
of its global policy with respect to the external social responsibility of the co-operative. 
However, 28% does not take any measures in this respect. Transparancy about the co-operatives 
policy and its impact and support of social projects are indicated by most of the co-operatives as 
items of external social responsibility. External communication about the measures taken is 
higher than with respect to internal social responsibility, especially with respect to the support 
of social and cultural projects, which is not surprising. But also internal communication about 
these measures is high (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
With respect to measures about the environment, recycling waste is an important item. More 
than half of the respondents (56%) indicates to take measures in this field and communication 
about it is the most intense. 39% of the respondents indicates to take measures on at least one 
of the environmental items. However, 38% says to take no environmental measures at all. 
Communication about these measures is limited (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
All in all, 61% of the respondents of the survey on accredited co-operatives indicate to take at 
least one CSR measure as part of a global policy, 15% says not to do so. Half of them are 
machinery rings. Controlled for economic activity sector and employers/non employers status, it 
seems that the chance for a co-operative to take CSR measures as part of a general policy 
increases as the co-operative is bigger in terms of members (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 
2008).8 
Socialization of profit is another method used by CSR-enterprises to practice corporate social 
responsibility. 11% of the co-operatives in the survey on accredited co-operatives in Belgium 
reported to share profits with other beneficiaries than their members. All but one are co-
operatives situated in the service sector. In the first place profit is shared via sponsoring (72%) 
whereby the co-operative get ‘naming’ in return, but donations (giving money and getting 
nothing in return) are also given by 44% of those who share profits (Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & 
Wyns, 2008). The in-depth interviews show that in those co-operatives who share profits to 
outside beneficiaries, this is a members’ decision. A big co-operative such as Cera, with more 
than 440.000 members, has established regional advisory councils specifically dedicated to 
decide upon the societal projects in their particular region that will be supported and who 
follow-up the results of these projects. A national advisory council decides upon the support to 
projects at a national level (Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005). Other methods used to 
socialize profit are granting reduced prices to target groups or organizations, giving special 
rewards to employees, granting patronage dividend to (non-member) customers, making high risk 
social investments with a low interest rate. Also sharing equipment and time for volunteering by 
                                                 
8 Logistic regression estimating a model in which not taking any CSR measure within the framework of a general policy is 
explained by the natural logarithm of the number of members (p < 0.05), dummies for economic activity sector en a 
dummy for employer/non employer status. Pseudo R² is 0.2189 with LR Chi2 (6) = 35.19, and p < 0.001 (Van Opstal, 
Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
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workers to non-profit organisations has been mentioned as a way to share profits (Van Opstal, 
Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
 
4 The Observed Pattern, Challenges and New Avenues 
 
Thomas (2004) states co-operatives’ participatory character is likely to result in greater 
stakeholder involvement. This, according to him, is one of the central advantages of the co-
operative model, next to other advantages such as enhanced efficiency and a large potential to 
attract volunteers. Levi (2001) and Pezzini (2006) stress the focus on co-operative values and 
‘concern for community’ which make co-operatives more likely to focus on goals beyond their 
members. The Green book of the European Commission (2007) refers to the reversed instrument-
goal relationship to argue that co-operatives are in good books with respect to the integration of 
stakeholders.  
 
However, co-operatives are not necessarily inclined to grant voice to multiple types of 
stakeholders. The classical model indeed is one with a single member-type. New forms of multi-
stakeholdership also need to be developed by co-operatives, in order to go beyond the internal 
orientation on members’ expectations and interests. 
 
Inspired by the spectrum of levels of public participation, developed by the International 
Association for Public Participation9 in which different forms of public participation are 
distinguished, ranging from information, over consultation, involvement, collaboration and 
empowerment, a distinction between four models of stakeholder management in co-operatives 
can be disguished: 
Model 1: the classical co-operative shareholder model (single type of members being user 
and shareholder at once). 
Model 2: model 1 with additionally external information channels and informal 
consultation of (some) other non-member stakeholders 
Model 3: model 2 with additionally involvement of (some types of) non-member 
stakeholders in the formal decision making structures of the co-operative 
Model 4: a multi-stakeholder co-operative in which different types of stakeholders are 
members i.c. co-operative shareholders who are granted decision making power 
 
A continuum between a single-stakeholder and a multi-stakeholder co-operative is likely to be 
observed: 
                                                 
9 www.iaps.org/practitioner tools/spectrum.html   
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Figure 5 Models of stakeholder involvement in co-operatives 
Classical co-operative 
shareholder model 
(single stakeholder) 
+ external information 
and informal 
consultation of non-
member stakeholders 
 
+ involvement of 
(some) non-member 
stakeholders in the 
decision making 
structures 
 
Multi-stakeholder 
(member) co-op 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
◄                      ► 
EMPOWERMENT OF 
MEMBERS 
◄                          ► 
INFORMATION   
CONSULTATION 
◄                     ► 
INVOLVEMENT 
◄                        ► 
EMPOWERMENT OF 
MULTIPLE 
STAKEHOLDERS 
WEAK MULTISTAKEHOLDERSHIP STRONG            
 
From the exploratory evidence presented above, we might cautiously conclude that most of the 
co-operatives investigated seem to have to be situated in model 1, some in model 2 and 3 giving 
more information and organizing consultation with other stakeholders. Attempts to open up co-
operative membership to multiple types of stakeholders are in a preliminary phase and it will be 
most interesting to learn how they cope with it.  
 
Indeed, the dominant co-operative model is a model with a single category of members 
(customers, workers, suppliers,…). By virtue of its constitution the co-operative is a type of 
enterprises, situated within the market, that is naturally inclined to stakeholder management, 
although not necessarily multi-stakeholder management. Co-operative’s primary stakeholders 
are their members, being both user and shareholder of the co-operative. As shareholders they 
are ‘stakeholders by design’, as users they are ‘natural stakeholders’ (cf. Tirole, 2001). As 
shareholders they are investor-driven, but as user they are clearly user-driven. By means of the 
principle of democratic member control, co-operative shareholders are not only financially but 
also socially ‘owners’ of their co-operative. Their financial share entitles them to have a share in 
the decision making process of the co-operative. Through co-operative decision making the 
mission and the objectives of the co-operative enterprise are decided upon. The co-operative 
principle of equal voting rights for all members has as a consequence that co-operatives do not 
know majority shareholders, impeding their will on the others and on other categories of 
stakeholders of the co-operative. Indeed, there is not necessarily a linear link between vote and 
magnitude of the financial shares. The principle states ‘one member, one vote’. In multi-
stakeholder co-operatives (the ones with multiple types of members) this very principle might 
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lead to a stronger voice for that category which is the highest in numbers (Lindsay & Hems, 
2004). 
 
Multi-stakeholdership is institutionalized in laws and regulations with respect to certain types of 
co-operatives, set up as legal forms for social entrepreneurship, such as the Italian ‘social co-
operative’ (SC) and the French ‘société co-operative d’intérêt collectif’ (SCIC). These co-
operatives serve social purposes such as the delivery of social goods and services or the work 
integration of target groups. In these co-operatives a co-operation between workers (often 
including volunteers), users, public authorities and other stakeholders is expected. This can be 
realized by broadening the single member type-model to multiple types of members (users-
owners), or by having one or a few categories of members and involving other stakeholders in 
one way or another.  
 
In the Italian SC, usually set up to cover caring or training activities, the following member 
categories can be distinguished (Thomas, 2004):  
- financing members, whose aim is largely one of making profit by financing cooperative 
activities internally through share subscription (de facto these financing members are 
usually patrons/benefactors, not speculators); 
- legal members, for whom provision is made in the SC statutes for financing and 
developing solidarity and non-profit making initiatives; 
- stake-holding members, who are not directly involved in running the enterprise but 
whose interest is to achieve profit by virtue of their financial support to it; 
- ordinary or co-operating members, who want to achieve their aspirations through 
participation in the co-operative but who are not entitled to exercise rights on mutuality 
services regarding the co-operative society (they can be employees or volunteers, the 
latter should not account for more than 50% of the co-operatives workforce); 
- technical and administrative members, who are restricted to the number required to run 
the SC efficiently; 
- honorary members; 
- public bodies delegating social services by stipulating agreements or contracts with SC’s. 
 
There are two types of SC’s: Type A SC’s provide health, social or educational services. Type B 
SC’s providing other types of goods or services with the aim to integrate disadvantaged people 
into the labour market. At least 30% of the members of a Type B SC should be from the 
disadvantaged target groups. All SC’s are obliged to operate in a financially transparent manner 
because of their preferential relationship with municipalities, the tax benefits they enjoy and 
the fact that new SC’s are financially supported by the Marconi Fund, which is financed by 
annual dedications of social co-operatives (3% of their annual income).10 
  
                                                 
10 Law 381/91 recognizing social co-operatives 
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In the French SCIC shares can be distributed among private and public sources. A 
multistakeholder management board must be established, with a minimum representation of 
employees and customers. Besides employees and customers other possible board members are 
beneficiaries of social services offered by the SCIC, volunteers, public authorities, donors and 
any other relevant party. None of the member groups should have more than 50% of the shares 
or less than 10%, except public authorities who can have no more than 20% of the shares. Voting 
power can be distributed among each stakeholder group according to the principle ‘one member-
one vote’, or it can be organized at a collegiate level where the voting powers of each 
stakeholder group may vary between 10 and 50% (Lindsay & Hems, 2004). 
 
However, realizing multi-stakeholdership in a day-to-day basis does not prove to be an easy task. 
In an analysis of the Italian social co-operatives, Borzaga & Santuari (2000) found that many of 
them are no longer multi-stakeholder organizations. In their analysis of the French sociétés 
coopératifs d’intérêt collectif Lindsay & Hems (2004) mention the tendency that over time, one 
group of stakeholders, or groups of stakeholders, with common interests will dominate the 
organization, to the detriment of the others. This is most likely to be the category of the 
managers, but is can also be the largest group of members when votes are distributed according 
to the principle of one man-one vote.  
 
The natural inclination toward stakeholder management in co-operatives might be hampered 
when managers, board members and commissioners have no member relationship to the co-
operative and are chosen on mere professional grounds, and not taking into account their 
adherence to the co-operative principles. Especially in bigger co-operatives, a trend can be 
observed toward professionalization of the management, managers being HRM and financial 
professionals in the first place, not members. This may give way to a decreasing power of the 
general assembly in favour of an increasingly powerful board of directors (Côté, 2001; Defourny, 
Simon & Adam, 2002; Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005; Gijselinckx, Develtere & 
Raymaekers, 2007). Yet, some of these big co-operative enterprises who engaged a highly 
professionalized board and management have found innovative and creative answers to possible 
agency-problems11 that could have emerged. For example, they have requested that board 
members should become members, or they established a mixed board, with an equal share of 
members chosen by the General Assembly on the one hand, and external professionals put 
forward by the Board but confirmed by the General Assembly on the other hand (Develtere, 
Meireman & Raymaekers, 2005; Gijselinckx, Develtere & Raymaekers, 2007).  
 
                                                 
11 Agency problems arise when shareholders do not have an insight in the interests of the managers. Managers do not 
always act in favour of the interests of the shareholders. The agency problem increases when information asymmetries 
between managers and shareholders become bigger. They can be reduced when mechanisms are put into place that 
equalize managers and shareholders’ interests (Gijselinckx & Van Opstal, 2008). 
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Not only managers, boards and commissioners should know and make use of the particularities of 
the co-operative model. Likewise, members should identify with their co-operative and the co-
operative values and principles. Otherwise, the advantages of the institutional relationship 
between members and their co-operatives can not be fully realized. In bigger co-operatives it is 
often experienced to be difficult to engage members and make them identify with the co-
operative and the co-operative values and principles. The distance between the individual 
member and the organization is long and the experience of member advantages is limited to 
material advantages (dividends, patronage dividends, and other sorts of price reductions). 
Several co-operatives therefore try to establish more decentralized forms of member 
participation in order to shorten the distance between the co-operative and the members and to 
be more embedded in the local communities in which their members live (Gijselinckx, Develtere 
& Raymaekers, 2007). 
 
The problem with the big numbers-category of members can be solved by granting particular 
categories that are central to the co-operative a stronger voice. The burden on voting rights 
mentioned in the Belgian legislation on social purpose companies and accredited co-operatives 
means a relaxation of the principle of one member. The idea still being that all members should 
have a say in the decision making process of their co-operative, but to give certain types of 
members, such as founding members, social institutions etc. a stronger voice. 
 
In the case that social movements are structurally linked to a co-operative and granted a specific 
position in the management process of a co-operative, they might even come closer to the model 
of a non-profit organization. It has been claimed that ideologically-driven organizations, such as 
non profit organizations, who are first and foremost driven by providing good quality goods or 
services to those in need, are more likely to perform high in terms of quality than organizations 
that are first and foremost driven by profit maximization. Co-operatives, as member 
organizations in the market, could be expected to provide better services to their members than 
non-member organizations (Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2008). When they are structurally linked to 
a social movement – which, in Belgium is the case for some of the big co-operatives (in the 
financial, pharmaceutical and fair trade sector, as well as in the provision of sustainable energy) 
– are linked to social movements, they may be even more inclined to protect the needs of non-
members and the wider community. However, from our data we cannot draw too strong 
conclusions on this. Further research is needed to prove it and see how it actually works, taking 
into account differences between the types of service provided by the co-operatives in question. 
 
Even in multi-stakeholder type co-operatives and certainly in singly type member co-operatives, 
there are various non-controlling (non-member) stakeholders. Tirole (2001) argues that 
contractual protections for non controlling stakeholders can be created by circumscribing the 
 24 
 
 
action set available to the controlling stakeholder by declining those actions that are more likely 
to have negative impact on other stakeholders. In Belgium for instance the quality and 
accessibility of health care, care for the elderly, education or other social services is regulated 
by law. Some services can only be provided for through non profit organizations. Here the 
legislation can be extended to include social purpose companies (Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 
2009). 
 
Another way to protect non controlling stakeholders is to try to make the claims of non 
controlling stakeholders as insensitive as possible to biased decision-making via flat claims and 
exit options (Tirole, 2001). When more than one provider of goods or services exists, these 
providers will likely engage in a competition, not only in terms of prices, but also in terms of 
quality, and especially in terms of a sound price-quality relation, because clients have the option 
to exit, or not to come in the first place. Establishing information lines about set prices and 
quality of products (reducing information asymmetry) will strengthen the operation of this 
mechanism. Flat claims can be organized through setting fixed prices or price margins, granting 
moderate managers’ advantages or restricting dividends as is imposed to accredited co-
operatives and social purpose companies.  
 
In Belgium, no legal framework with respect to multi-stakeholder co-operatives has been 
developed. The Belgian law on ‘social purpose companies’ is one that comes closest to 
stimulating multi-stakeholdership, in the sense that it stimulates democratic workers 
participation for those companies engaging paid employees. In case the social purpose company 
has working members, each member should not be granted more than 5% of the votes. This way 
at least two categories of stakeholders are to be represented in the general assembly of the 
social purpose company: non-working members and working members. But in practice it does not 
seem to be an easy task to involve working members and let them participate in all topics of 
decision making. In the focus group ‘social purpose companies’ reported a difficult point with 
respect to the participation of member-workers, especially when they are working with 
disadvantaged groups. Not only because of the expected financial contribution the workers have 
to make, and the skills they might lack, but also in terms of decision making on questions related 
to the employer-employee relationship (Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2008). 
 
Initiatives to develop multi-stakeholder models of co-operatives and social purpose companies 
are gingerly growing in the fields of social service delivery and the production/distribution of 
sustainable energy. In view of the challenges mentioned, it will be extremely fascinating to see 
if and how they will succeed in developing and maintaining real multi-stakeholder models. 
Practice, as well as theoretical modelling will have to learn how multiple stakeholders can best 
be realized. 
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Annex 1 
General information on co-operatives in the Survey on accredited co-operatives in Belgium, 2006 
(from Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns, 2008). 
 
In the Autumn 2006 the Cera Centre for Co-operative Entrepreneurship (HIVA, KULeuven), in 
collaboration with the Centre d’Economie Sociale (ULg), conducted a survey among accredited 
co-operatives in Belgium. A questionnaire was sent to 558 accredited co-operatives, listed by the 
National Council for Co-operation. We received 175 fully completed questionnaires. 
Methodological details about the survey can be obtained from the author. The information on the 
co-operatives in the survey is entirely based on Van Opstal, Gijselinckx and Wyns (2008).   
Economic activities of co-operatives in the survey 
 
The majority of the co-operatives surveyed is delivers services (58%). Figures are presented for 
financial co-operatives (financial holdings, co-operative investors, and co-operative insurance 
services) and pharmacies separately, because those groups are clearly delineated and are very 
dissimilar in many respects. The other service delivering co-operatives form a very 
heterogeneous reality, encompassing co-operatives active in the field of sustainable energy, co-
operative auctions, co-operatives of small and independent businesses, consumer co-operatives 
and real estate co-operatives.  
 
36% of the co-operatives surveyed is active in the primary sector. We make a distinction between 
machinery rings and other agricultural co-operatives (like fruit tree nurseries and sales co-
operatives). The co-operatives in the secondary sector are active in fields such as printing, dairy, 
furniture and construction. Co-operatives in the Flemish region and Brussels capital region are 
more likely to be active in the tertiary sector, whereas we find more agricultural co-operatives 
in the Walloon region.  
Age of the co-operatives surveyed 
 
The vast majority of co-operatives in the survey is not older than 20 years. However, the oldest 
one dates back to 1886. Machinery rings belong to the youngest category (between 9 and 14 
years of age). Pharmacies are amongst the oldest ones (median of 30 years of age). It has to be 
noted that co-operatives may know a longer history than reported through the age variable. The 
current co-operatives may be the result of mergers or other re-organizations.  
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Table A.1 Age of co-operatives (Survey of accredited co-operatives in Belgium, 2006) 
  N Average Standard error Q25 
Median 
(Q50) Q75 
Total 160 26 2.09 9 15 28 
According to sector       
 Primary sector 58 14 2.03 9 11 14 
      Machinery rings 40 12 1.22 7.5 9.5 13 
      Others  18 19 5.90 10 11,5 17 
 Secondary sector 10 27 9.68 3 19 42 
 Tertiary sector 92 33 3.03 13.5 21.5 41.5 
      Pharmacies 12 50 10.38 23.5 29.5 71 
      Financial co-ops 21 33 6.45 14 17 41 
      Others 59 29 3.45 11 19 41 
N: 160 (item non-response: 15) 
Hypothesis differences between sectors: p < 0.001 (Kruskal Wallis Test: Chi2 = 26.121 (ties), 2 d.f.) 
Hypothesis differences within primary sector: p < 0.1 (Mann-Whitney Test: z = 1.949) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx and Wyns (2008)   
Legal personality 
 
Most of the co-operatives surveyed (75%) are so-called co-operative societies with limited 
liability. 4 of them report themselves to be a social purpose company. Most of the co-operative 
societies with unlimited liability are machinery rings and co-operatives who do not have paid 
employment. 
 
Number of members 
 
All co-operatives surveyed together have more than 2.1 million members. Most of them are small 
or very small in terms of members: more than half of the respondents has no more than 10 
members. Most of them are machinery rings. Pharmacies and Financial co-operatives have the 
biggest number of members. Together they represent 97.65% of the members in the database. 
The biggest co-operatives are Group ARCO (more than 900,000 members) and Cera (440,000 
members).  
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Table A.2 Number of members of co-operatives surveyed (Survey on accredited co-
operatives in Belgium, 2006) 
 Distribution Total 
 3 4 - 10 11 – 100 101 – 1000 > 1000 Number % 
Total 30% 24% 14% 11% 21% 2,114,691 100% 
 Primary sector 59% 30% 8% 2% 2% 19,068  0.90% 
      Machinery rings 66% 30% 5% 0% 0% 185 0.01% 
      Others  41% 29% 18% 6% 6% 18,883 0.89% 
 Secondary sector 10% 20% 30% 20% 20% 8,083 0.38% 
 Tertiary sector 12% 21% 16% 16% 35% 2,087,540 98.72% 
      Pharmacies 0% 0% 9% 18% 73% 513,260 24.27% 
      Financial co-ops 5% 0% 5% 19% 71% 1,551,708 73.38% 
      Others 18% 33% 21% 14% 14% 22,572 1.07% 
N: 160 (item nonrespons: 15) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx and Wyns (2008)  
 
Employment in co-operatives surveyed 
 
51% of the respondents has paid employment. Compared to macro figures on accredited co-
operatives (Dujardin & Mertens, 2008), this means a little over representation of co-operatives 
with paid employment in the survey. Most employees are to be found in pharmacies and financial 
co-operatives and least of all in agricultural co-operatives. Only 17% of the co-operatives 
mention volunteers. Subsidized employment is only to be found in 3% of the co-operatives 
studied. 
 
Table A.3 Categories of employment in co-operatives (Survey on accredited co-operatives 
in Belgium, 2006) 
Primary sector Tertiary sector  
Total Machinery 
rings Others  
Secondary 
sector Pharmacies Financial  co-ops Others 
Paid employment 50% 0% 18% 78% 100% 100% 67% 
Independent workers 58% 93% 82% 57% 0% 54% 42% 
Voluntary workers 17% 10% 24% 11% 0% 23% 22% 
Stagiairs 4% 0% 0% 14% 8% 15% 3% 
Temporary workers 11% 0% 0% 14% 8% 31% 16% 
Subsidized employment 3% 0% 6% 0% 0% 8% 3% 
Others (family, …) 1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
N: 156 (item nonrespons: 19) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx and Wyns (2008)  
 
In general the co-operatives surveyed employ 3,700 persons, or 3,129.17 FTE. Most of them are 
situated within the co-operative pharmacies who account for almost 40% of paid employment 
reported. More than 60% of the them has more than 50 paid employees. 95% of the agricultural 
co-operatives have no paid employment. 
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Table A.4 Number of paid employees  
 Distribution Total 
 0 1 – 10 11 – 50 51 – 100 > 100 Number % 
Total 50% 26% 13% 5% 6% 3,700 100% 
 Primary sector 95% 3% 0% 0% 2% 255 6.89% 
      Machinery rings 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0% 
      Others  82% 12% 0% 0% 6% 255 6.89% 
 Secondary sector 22% 22% 33% 0% 22% 795 21.49% 
 Tertiary sector 24% 41% 19% 8% 8% 2,650 71.26% 
      Pharmacies 0% 23% 15% 31% 31% 1,468 39.68% 
      Financial co-ops 0% 46% 46% 0% 8% 364 9.84% 
      Others 23% 44% 15% 5% 3% 818 22.11% 
N: 155 (item non-response: 20) 
Source: Van Opstal, Gijselinckx & Wyns (2008) 
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Annex 2 
 
Participants of in-depth interviews with co-operatives (from Develtere, Meireman & Raymaekers, 
2005) 
 
- Alterfin (investment co-operative) 
- Cera (co-operative holding) 
- Costentpark (tree nursery) 
- Crédal (investment co-operative) 
- Gents Ecologisch Centrum (ecological techniques) 
- De Groene Waterman (bookshop) 
- Ecopower (sustainable energy) 
- Het Hinkelspel (biological cheese) 
- JZH & Partners (engineers and architects) 
- Laiterie Coopérative de Chéoux (milk co-operative) 
- Mechelse Veilingen (auction of fruit and vegetables) 
- Milcobel (dairy co-operative) 
- Ophaco (co-operative pharmacies) 
- Opnieuw & Co (recycling) 
- Trois Petits Fours (biological bakery products) 
- Boerenbond (farmers union) 
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Annex 3 
 
General information on the non-accredited co-operatives (Van Opstal & Gijselinckx, 2008) and 
social purpose companies (Dujardin, Mertens & Van Opstal, 2008) participating in the focus 
groups held in the June 2008. 
 
Participants of focus group with non accredited co-operatives 
 
- Druk in de Weer cvba (printing co-operative) 
- Incofin cvso (social investment company, micro financing in developing countries) 
- Living Stone Group (tourism and intercultural entrepreneurship) 
- Boweco cvba (co-operative of tree nurseries) 
- Magelaan cvba (communication services) 
- ACE-IT cvoa (ICT) 
- Dexia (bank and insurance) 
- ACCO cvba (publisher) 
- Colibro cvba (bookshops) 
- Menouquin cv (hardware stores) 
 
Participants of focus group with social purpose companies 
 
- Home Wellness cvba-so (home care services) 
- Landelijk Dienstencoöperatief cvba-so & Landelijk Jobcoöperatief cvba-so (home care 
services) 
- Kasteelhoeve Poeke cvba-so (agriculture) 
- Max Havelaar cvba-so (fair trade) 
- De Beitel nv-so (start-up centre) 
- De Kempense Brug cvba-so (start-up centre) 
- Netwerk Rentevrij cvba-so (investment co-operative) 
- Oikocredit cvba-so (investment co-operative, social responsible investment) 
- DEBUut cvba-so (activity co-operative) 
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